Do We Know What We Know Internally or Externally?
Internalism and externalism concern themselves with how one is to justify the truth of their beliefs in the pursuit of knowledge. Internalism argues that one can formulate basic epistemic principles, that operate to produce justified belief without any reference to anything external to the mind. Externalism argues that justification can occur through a process that is external to a knower’s mind. The justification of a belief is linked to perceptual processes, and environmental, linguistic, and psychological factors. Thus, arises the disagreement; does justification occur internally, or externally? This treatise argues that neither hard internalism nor externalism alone, can produce justified true belief. A nuanced externalism that makes use of internal concepts seems the appropriate answer.
Goldman argues a reliabilist externalism. The reliabilist suggests that a person arrives at knowledge of p, if they can reliably distinguish or discriminate the truth of p, from the relevant state of affairs in which p is false. Goldman defines this reliability as the capacity for which cognitive mechanisms can recognize incompatibilities in the different states of the world and generate contrasting responses. If these mechanisms are reliable, when presented with a blue object and a red object, they will generate contrary perceptions, and thus contrary beliefs about that object and the environment; there is no requirement to know the exact internal nature of this operation. Goldman defines relevant states of affairs, as the considerations that the knower makes when justifying their belief. The term relevant is difficult to pin down, however can be taken as what (in the context of the justification being made) is immediately appropriate to the knower in their ability to justify their belief. Goldman discusses at length the importance of the external context in which a knower justifies their belief. The orientation of the knower to the subject of their justification; the mental state that has been set forth in them by their environment; the framing of truth value sentences by other agents; are all important external factors that determine the justification of a belief. Goldman’s externalism is visible in the case of Sam, who is about to be greeted by twins Trudy and Judy. Sam correctly identifies Judy when he greets her, but Goldman wants to ask, “under what circumstances would we say that Sam knows it is Judy?” If Sam had mistaken Trudy for Judy, would he have recognized his mistake? Sam is confronted by a perceptual equivalent in which the percept of Judy may actually be the percept of Trudy. Because of Sam’s difficulty discriminating their features from one another, he cannot be said to know that either is Trudy or Judy. Thus, Sam’s justification of knowing is dependent upon the actual and environmental externalities of his percept of either Trudy or Judy’s features. Justification of true belief then, is reliant on factors and processes external to the mind.
Chisholm provides a clear account of internalism: through reflection on one’s own conscious state, a “set of epistemic principles” can generate justification for any particular belief one may have. Chisholm argues for this internalism through directly criticizing both casual and reliability theory externalism. Chisholm’s critique is founded in the claim that “there is no logical connection between epistemic justification and truth”. This is the beginning of his larger criticism which is that externalism results in essentially empty statements about truth, because it fails to adequately account for the separation of justification from true belief. The discussion between internalism and externalism for Chisholm is squarely about justification, truth is an entirely separate matter. Externalist’s arrive at one of two possible conclusions, their proposals are empty, or they require supplementation from internal justification concepts. Chisholm demonstrates the disjunction in the concept of what is reliable. Reliable process is taken to mean a “process that is productive of true belief”. If this is the case, justification is simply anything that can be classed as a procedure, in turn reducing justification to nothing but true belief. The externalist then must accept defeat or introduce internalism in their theory of justification.
Chisholm makes clear the reduction of justification to true belief in externalism, and is right in doing so. If justification is simply a process that is productive of true belief, then Goldman has failed to properly account for justification. If Sam uses what is at his disposal to justify his assumption that who he is greeting is Judy and not Trudy, the contingency of the fact of the matter has no place in the status of his being justified or not. Goldman’s reliability theory makes justification contingent on the actual truth-value of the proposition, which is an error in a proper theory of justification. Internalism however is not without its own short-comings. The ends of justified true belief are surely to produce knowledge, and knowledge must reflect truth. Internalism while having a superior account of justification, does not account properly for truth. For Sam to know that he is greeting Judy, he will adopt external processes in order to finally produce knowledge. Thus, neither hard internalism nor externalism alone, can produce justified true belief. A nuanced externalism that makes use of internal concepts seems the appropriate answer.
References:
Chisholm, R. (1988). The indispensability of internal justification. Synthese, 74(3), pp.285-296.
Goldman, A. (1976). Discrimination and Perceptual Knowledge. The Journal of Philosophy, 73(20), pp.771-791.
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