McTaggart and The Existence or Non-Existence of Time

One of the most fundamental themes in all of philosophy is time. Metaphysics has paid special attention to the subject, producing theories dramatic enough that they question the very nature of the universe and existence. The twentieth century metaphysician John McTaggart had no fear of such philosophical theatrics when publishing his work entitled: ‘The Unreality of Time’. McTaggart's task was to prove, as his title suggests, that time is in fact wholly unreal. His argument is alarmingly convincing, and to defend the comfortable reality of time against it is no small measure. Despite the difficulty, this paper will attempt to demonstrate that McTaggart’s argument is not entirely complete, and that the idea of Presentism can offer some comfort to those seeking to restore their faith in the existence of time. The paper will first outline each set of McTaggart’s arguments against the existence of time: 1) the distinction between A series, B series, and C series time; 2) the fundamentality of the A series to the existence of time; 3) the incoherence of the A series; and finally 4) the non-existence of time. It appears that McTaggart’s claim that there is an incoherence in the A series is problematic and this paper argues that Presentism provides recourse to this effect. With the problem of incoherence dispatched, time and its existence in this case are effectively restored.

McTaggart begins by determining how he believes time to appear prima facie, this naturalistic view of time takes two forms. The first is in terms of earlier than and later than. Of these time distinctions, they cannot change, they are permanent and fixed. When a point in time is plucked from the event line, and then compared to another event on that same line, the event will always be either earlier than or later than some other event. The second prima facie view of time is that it can be broken down into past, present, and future. This time distinction is not permanent, events running on this event line do change. When I say something is in the future, I also must mean that it will eventually find its way into the present, and from the present, that event will then find its way into the past. This event changes as it moves in time.

McTaggart describes this distinction as follows: “If M is ever earlier than N, it is always earlier. But an event, which is now present, was future and will be past” (McTaggart 2014). What McTaggart is saying here is if an event, for example the opening of a door (M), is earlier than the event of walking through the doorway (N), those events will remain in that order permanently. However, if we think of opening the door as an event in the present, that event will soon enter into the past. The event of walking through the doorway was in the future, but is now in the present, and will soon, like the event of opening the door, be in the past. What McTaggart wants us to realise here is that time considered as 'earlier than, later than' appears permanent, whereas time considered as 'past,present, future' appears to be fluid. Thus, on the surface of our interpretation of time, there appears to be an inconsistency.

Initial assumptions may consider that because of the permanence of the 'earlier than, later than', view of time, it is somehow more essential to the nature of time itself. McTaggart however, demonstrates that the 'past, present, future' distinction is more fundamental. To do this, he categorizes each view of time into a series: the A series and B series of time.

Series A, or the 'past, present, future' distinctions of time are the “positions running from the far past through the near past to the present, and then from the present to the near future and the far future” (McTaggart 2014). Series B are the “positions which [run] from earlier to later” (McTaggart 2014). In addition to these two series, McTaggart introduces a third, the C series of time. The C series is similar to the B series, in that it is an ordered event line, however the C series distinguishes between events by determining a time value. Rather than an earlier and later distinction, events on the C series are either greater than or lesser than, being ordered along a number line in relation to a time axis.

The B series distinguishes between events by the temporal relationship of earlier than or later than, which orders events by their relation to one another in time. This means that an event is earlier or later depending on the event that it is drawn in comparison to. The C series, instead of this, wants to position events not in relation to one another, but against time itself. It does this by granting a time value of lesser than or greater than. Having established A series, B series, and C series of time, McTaggart seeks to determine which of the prima facie series of time are most essential to the nature and existence of time. To do this, he applies both the A and B series to the C series. By establishing which prima facie time series is essential, and which is not, McTaggart can find the target of his argument for the non-existence of time.

Having considered the prima facie views of time that form the A series and B series, the question arises as to whether it is “essential to the reality of time that its events should form an A series as well as a B series[?]” (McTaggart 2014). What appears most apparent is that what is perceived directly is perceived in the present. That is to say, what we can sense immediately must be with us at that moment in the present time. If there was to be any other perception of an event, it would be either by the use of memory when recalling events in the past, or by inference when making judgements as to what is coming in the future.

To make distinctions between what was future, is present, and will be past, observations of time must accept that what is earlier than present is past, and what is later than present is future. This appears to suggest that all observations require both the A series and B series to have a complete formulation of time. McTaggart argues however, that it is only the A series that provides the most necessary component of time, which is the component of change.

Time requires change in order to exist. If there was to be a universe without change, that universe would have to be a completely still, changeless, static universe - thus, time would not be able to exist. In a B time series, points are picked out from the event line and determined to be either earlier than, or later than in relation to one another. Once two or more events enter into such a relationship, they become static, they cannot change their status of earlier than, or later than. Imagine that at time t1 lightning strikes, and at time t2 thunder bellows. The time at which the lightning struck will always have been earlier than the thunder. When applied to the C series time t1, in relation to time t2, will never cease to be anything other than earlier than. Therefore, time t1 will always produce a static value on the C series resulting in a changelessness. If the B series cannot produce change, then it cannot provide a functional description of time.

In an A time series, this changelessness is not in effect. Events move from the future, to the present, and then off into the past providing for the necessity of change. The A series when applied to the C series, provides the temporality to an otherwise static number line. Each event must pass from future, to present, and from present, to past. So, at time t1, the lightning will be in the distant future, then the future, then move into the present, before entering the past, and then the distant past. This time relation is dynamic, as an event’s time value is measured against the present moving along the event line, rather than measured as the distance between two static event points. McTaggart therefore, demonstrates that any formulation of the nature of time, must fundamentally rely on the A series of time if it is to properly account for the necessity of change.

Having established the fundamentality of the A series and thus the target of his critique, McTaggart now proceeds to demonstrate that the A series is in fact incoherent, thus rendering time unreal. In doing so, McTaggart argues that the A series is contradictory and ultimately produces an infinite regress. He points out that if an event is said to be past, that would have to imply that it has been present, and has been future. When that event was future, it would have to eventually be present, and then be past. That same event again when present, was future, and will very soon be past. Any event then, future, present, or past, does not contain one of these distinctions but all of them, which is problematic.

If the A series is to be productive of the change that is necessary for time, then an event being past, present and future all at once cannot be possible. No one event can hold, without contradiction, any more than one of the time values, past, present, or future. At first this contradiction may appear redundant when the correct tense is applied. Surely an event is never past, present, and future “it is present, will be past, and has been future” (McTaggart 2014).

McTaggart demonstrates however, that applying the correct tense does not manage to escape the contradiction, and is in fact indicative of the circular reasoning of the A series. For if tense is enough to account for the contradiction that must assume that time's existence is a condition of its coherence. This would mean that time’s existence must be already assumed when accounting for the A series, but the A series, as McTaggart pointed out, was fundamental for time. “Accordingly the A series has to be pre-supposed in order to account for the A series” (McTaggart 2014). What McTaggart points out is that if the A series must assume that time already exists, but for time to exist there must be an A series, then the reasoning for time and the A series has entered an endlessly regressive paradox.

The difficulty in deciding from what time we can make judgements about which events are past, present, or future helps to unpack the regressive contradiction in the A series further. Imagine a moment in the present which we call time t2. According to anyone in moment t2, this particular moment is the present. From time t2, it would appear that time t1 is in the past, and time t3 is in the future. According to those in the moment time t3 however, time t3 is present. This would mean, that for them time t2 is in fact in the past.

There is nothing to suggest either moment has a more fundamental perception of its position relative to the past, present, and future. All of these events are merely distributed along an event line with the temporal relation of the A series providing a system of categorisation as past, present, or future. Thus, times t1, t2, and t3, according to the A series, would all be past, present, and future at once because there is no way of determining which point in time to make judgements from. If all events at all moments are past, present, and future then the A series cannot produce any change at all among them, and so cannot be said to produce time.

A reading of Presentism may offer some solution to this problem. Presentism, crudely, is the view that only the present exists, there is no past existence, and no future existence (Markosian 2014). The claim then is that which exists must be present and present only, meaning that we may be able to judge from the present about which events are past, present, and future restoring the production of change by the A series.

Thinking in trivial terms, it is not unreasonable to suggest that Napoleon does not exist. He died in 1821 on the island of Saint Helena, so we can say that he did exist, but ceases to in the present. The same can be said of the first child to be born in the year 2020. This child does not exist now in the present, but it will exist in the future (Mozersky 2011). Defenders of Presentism such as Thomas M. Crisp provide more technical descriptions of the same concept: “presentism is the claim that it is always the case that, quantifying unrestrictedly, for every x, x is present” (Crisp 2005). According to Crisp's view, Presentism suggests that if you were to quantify and account for everything in existence at any moment in time, you would only account those things presently existing, you would not account for each and every individual entity that ever had, or ever will exist - existence is only that which is here and now.

Rethinking McTaggart’s claim to have demonstrated the unreality of time, Presentism offers an avenue for time to dispatch the contradiction of the A series and restore the production of change. The A series contradiction assumes that each moment possesses all three temporal characteristics, past, present, and future. Because of this, there can be no change, and so there can be no time. However, when introducing Presentism, the first thing that becomes apparent, is that each moment is not only passing into the present, but into existence. McTaggart's argument abstracts time from existence.

Change does not just occur along a timeline in terms of temporal characterisation, it also occurs in the changing metaphysical status of each moment as it passes from non-existent future, into existent present, and from existent present, into non-existent past. Therefore, the present is granted the special metaphysical position of existence among the three characteristics (Meyer 2013). The present is the only temporal reference point with the metaphysical status from which any retrospection or prospection can occur. Therefore, McTaggart's contradiction, of each moment being an equally relevant reference point for categorising events is removed and the change necessary for time's existence is restored.

McTaggart’s argument for the unreality of time is compelling and rigorous. His dismantling of the B series and of static concepts of time has necessitated a greater philosophical understanding of time. The value that McTaggart ascribed to the A series was done with great success, however, the contradiction that occurs within the A series is overstated. Rethinking McTaggart's arguement in light of Presentism makes the incoherence of the A series utterly false. McTaggart failed to recognise the metaphysical nuances of time and existence, resulting in an incomplete critique of the A series, and thus of time. The special metaphysical status afforded to the present by Presentism is enough to demonstrate that the temporal relation is not just past, present future, but non-existent past, existent present, and non-existent future. This provides the reference point that McTaggart was seeking, and removes any contradictions that he thought would prove that unreality of time.

References:

Crisp, Thomas M. 2005. "Presentism." In The Oxford Handbook of Metaphysics, edited by Michael J. Loux and Dean W. Zimmerman. London: Oxford University Press.

Markosian, Ned. 2014. Time. In Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Stanford, California: Standford University.

McTaggart, J. 2014. "The Unreality of Time." Kriterion 55 (130):747-764.

Meyer, Ulrich. 2013. Presentism: Oxford University Press.

Mozersky, M. Joshua. 2011. "Presentism." In The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Time, edited by Craig Callender, 122-148. Oxford University Press.